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On its face, predicting the Biden administration’s international energy 
policy would appear simple:  look up the policy of the Obama administration.  
Repeat.  Done.  There is, of course, more than a little truth to such an 
understanding of the Biden administration.  President Biden is himself an 
alumnus of the Obama administration with significant input on the foreign 
policy and energy policy decisions from the Obama administration.  Many of 
the people who will be tasked with implementing the Biden administration’s 
international energy policy will themselves also be alumni and alumnae of the 
Obama administration.  Surely, then there will be more than a little overlap 
between where the Obama administration left off and the Biden administration 
will begin.   
But one should tread cautiously in assuming that a Biden administration 
will simply pick up where the Obama administration left off.  There are three 
important factors to consider.  The first is the simple passage of time.  The 
passage of time is a particularly dramatic factor for international energy policy 
due to the climate change clock.  Current estimates suggest that climate 
tipping points will be reached by 2030.1  These estimates may well be overly 
optimistic.  Four years of relative domestic and international inaction therefore 
leaves the Biden administration with a qualitatively different starting position 
 
* Senator Robert J. Dole Distinguished Professor of Law, Washburn University School of 
Law.   
1. UNITED NATIONS, EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2019 46 (2019).   
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than a Clinton administration would have encountered.  As such, the Biden 
administration cannot simply use the Obama playbook.  The runway to 
doomsday has now been shortened by approximately one-third.   
The second factor is economic.  The COVID-19 pandemic has left the 
world in a state of severe economic distress.  It has killed more than 2.3 million 
people worldwide.2  It has shut down countries and continents.  In the process, 
it has severely tested existing supply lines and thrown global markets into 
chaos.  One might thus analogize that the world finds itself closer to 2008 
economically than 2016.  The important caveat being that massive 
government resources—in the trillions of dollars—have already been 
marshaled to hold at bay the worst consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic.3  
These resources, therefore, look to be potentially unavailable to combat 
climate change.   
The third factor is personal.  President Biden by all accounts is far more 
of a moderate on global energy policy than many Obama administration 
alumni and possibly President Obama himself.  President Biden is in many 
ways an institutionalist and traditionalist—dare one say a “small-c 
conservative.”  He would thus be less inclined towards radical and fast change 
than the prior administration would have been.   
Where does that leave the Biden administration?  As this Essay will 
explore, it requires the Biden administration to respond to a worsening energy 
trilemma at the time of increased geopolitical tensions that add further 
challenges to this trilemma.  The Biden administration hopes to resolve this 
trilemma with an integrated vision of “building back better.”4  This vision of 
“building back better” hopes to respond to each of the prongs of the energy 
trilemma, while keeping an eye on geopolitical, energy-related tensions.5   
The Biden administration finds itself in a bind in resolving this energy 
trilemma.  As we shall see, the Biden administration’s approach to 
international economic governance is small-c conservative.  This small-c 
conservativism is ultimately incompatible with taking the build back better 
program to a global scale.  Such a program can only be realized to the extent 
the Biden administration invests greater political and diplomatic capital in free 
trade agreements and building a deeper international economic order to 
support energy transition.   
 
2. Covid-19 Coronavirus Pandemic, WORLDOMETERS, https://www.worldometers.info/ 
coronavirus/ (last updated Feb. 27, 2021).   
3. INT’L MONETARY FUND, A YEAR LIKE NO OTHER:  IMF ANNUAL REPORT 2020 5 (2020).   
4. The Biden Plan to Build a Modern Sustainable Infrastructure and An Equitable Clean Energy 
Future, BIDENHARRIS, https://joebiden.com/clean-energy/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2021) [hereinafter Biden 
Build].   
5. The Biden Plan to Secure Environmental Justice and Equitable Economic Activity, 
BIDENHARRIS, https://joebiden.com/environmental-justice-plan/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2021) [hereinafter 
Biden Plan].   
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I. ENERGY TRILEMMA 
This section addresses the underlying challenge energy policy poses on 
the international stage.  It outlines that energy policy traditionally responds to 
a trilemma of:  environmental sustainability, energy equity/affordability, and 
energy security.  This trilemma transcends energy policy and in fact, is at the 
heart of international energy law.  The section outlines that current 
circumstances exacerbate the urgency of each of the prongs of the dilemma.   
The energy trilemma is reflected already in the core themes struck by 
then President Biden’s transition.6  President Biden’s central message in his 
victory speech was that “I believe it's this:  Americans have called upon us to 
marshal the forces of decency, the forces of fairness, to marshal the forces of 
science and the forces of hope in the great battles of our time.”7  Relevantly 
for current purposes, President Biden highlighted the battle to build 
prosperity.8  He also highlighted, “the battle to save our planet by getting 
climate under control.”9  President Biden’s transition website similarly lists as 
two of its four priorities “economic recovery” and “climate change.”10  This 
speech at core thus hits on two of the three prongs of the energy trilemma—
environmental sustainability (climate change) and energy equity/affordability 
(building prosperity).   
The third prong of the energy trilemma is about energy security.11  
Energy security is about the security of energy supply.12  This security of 
supply is threatened in two separate, yet equally important ways.  First, it is 
threatened by external, geopolitical events.13  One example of such external, 
geo-political events includes recent violent tensions between Iran, Saudi 
Arabia, and the United States.14  These tensions led to a drone attack on one 
 
6. Id.   
7. Read the full text of Joe Biden's speech after historic election, ABC (Nov. 7, 2020), 
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/read-full-text-joe-bidens-speech-historic-election/story?id=74084462.   
8. Id.   
9. Id.   
10. Priorities, BIDEN-HARRIS TRANSITION, https://buildbackbetter.gov/priorities/ (last visited 
Jan 15, 2021).   
11. World Energy Trilemma Index, WORLD ENERGY COUNCIL, https://www.worldenergy.org/ 
transition-toolkit/world-energy-trilemma-index (last visited Jan. 15, 2021).   
12. Daniel Yergin, Ensuring Energy Security, 85 FOREIGN AFF. 69, 69–78 (2006).   
13. Oil security:  The global oil market remains vulnerable to a wide range of risk factors, INT’L 
ENERGY AGENCY (Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.iea.org/areas-of-work/ensuring-energy-security/oil-
security (last visited Jan. 19, 2021).   
14. See Ellen R. Wald, 3 Reasons Iran Can’t Put a Toll on the Straits of Hormuz, FORBES (July 
8, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenrwald/2019/07/08/3-reasons-iran-cant-put-a-toll-on-the-strait-
of-hormuz/?sh=45267cb75ff2 (discussing summer 2019 threats to navigation through the straits); Rockford 
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of Saudi Arabia’s largest oil refining installations, sending shockwaves 
through energy markets.15  Further, Iran has threatened one of the most 
important shipping lanes for global oil supplies, the Straits of Hormuz.16  
Three similarly important areas of tension include:  1) the South China Sea, 
an area in which the People’s Republic of China is currently threatening 
energy security through unlawful enforcement actions; 2) the Black Sea, an 
area in which Russia threatens energy security by unlawfully annexed Crimea; 
and 3) the Baltic Sea, an area of importance for European pipeline access that 
is seeing increased Russian escalation.17   
Second, energy security also can be impaired for reasons internal to 
existing energy markets.  These markets cannot rely upon technology that is 
unable to deliver energy when it is needed.  One such problem is the so-called 
intermittent problem of renewable energy (how to deliver energy when the 
sun does not shine and the wind does not blow).18  This problem has also arisen 
in traditional energy markets, with the 2001 rolling California blackouts being 
one example.19   
These three prongs of the energy trilemma are reflected in a number of 
international legal regimes.  Environmental sustainability and climate change 
are subject to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
 
Weitz, Explainer:  Could Iran Close the Strait of Hormuz, NAVY TIMES (Jan. 7, 2020), 
https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2020/01/08/explainer-could-iran-close-the-strait-of-
hormuz/; see also Iran Seizes British Tanker in Strait of Hormuz, BBC (July 20, 2019), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-49053383; Ben Hubbard et al., Two Major Saudi Oil Installations Hit by 
Drone Strike, and U.S. Blames Iran, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/14/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-refineries-drone- attack.html (last 
updated Jan.15, 2020) (discussing the drone strike on Abqaiq and Khurais); see also Saudi Arabia Oil 
Attacks:  UN 'Unable to Confirm Iranian Involvement’, BBC (Dec. 11, 2019), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50742224 (discussing Iranian disputing responsibility for 
the drone strike).   
15. Hubbard, supra note 14.   
16. See Wald, supra note 14; see also Weitz, supra note 14.   
17. See Tensions flare over South China Sea energy reserves, ARGUS (July 17, 2019), 
https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/1941353-tensions-flare-over-south-china-sea-energy-reserves; see 
also Ariel Cohen, As Russia Closes In On Crimea's Energy Resources, What Is Next For Ukraine?, FORBES 
(Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2019/02/28/as-russia-closes-in-on-crimeas-
energy-resources-what-is-next-for-ukraine/?sh=69b3408929cd; see also Andrew E. Kramer, Pipeline 
Politics:  Why Nord Stream 2 Is Back in the Spotlight, N.Y. TIMES, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/14/world/europe/nord-stream-2-russia-germany.html (last updated 
Sept. 16, 2020).   
18. Paul Rogers, California grid operator warned of power shortages as state transitioned to 
clean energy, MERCURY NEWS, https://www.mercurynews.com/2020/08/17/california-blackouts-expose-
problems-in-states-transition-to-clean-energy/ (last updated Aug. 17, 2020).   
19. Id.   
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and the Paris Agreement concluded under its auspices.20  Questions of energy 
affordability and equity fall under human rights as well as international 
economic law consisting broadly of trade and investment law.21  Energy 
security in turn can be improved both by international economic law to address 
internal energy problems, regimes governing international peace, and security 
to address geopolitical threats.   
Each of these different prongs of the trilemma, in addition, calls on 
multiple other international legal regimes to the floor.  Most centrally, 
international climate concerns have also raised human rights issues.22  These 
human rights issues have led domestic courts in the Netherlands to order 
governments to increase their emission reduction targets.23  These issues have 
also made headway in the Inter-American system to focus on the human rights 
implications of climate change and thus increased pressure to increase climate 
action.24   
At the same time, such human rights concerns also affect energy equity.25  
Energy is one of the backbones necessary for economic activity.26  It is 
essential to deliver healthcare services and education, and thus central to 
development.27  Moreover, it is central to a host of positive human rights to 
the point that scholars have posited the existence of a right to electricity.28   
As the Biden administration focuses on energy and climate policy, it, 
therefore, acts not just in one area of international law.  Rather, its policies 
 
20. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, Sept. 5, 1992, S. 
TREATY DOC NO. 102–38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107; see also Paris Agreement art. 2, Dec. 12, 2015, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev/ [hereinafter Paris Agreement].   
21. Apurvaa Pandey, Energy:  A Basic Human Right, GEOPOLITICAL MONITOR (Apr. 24, 2018), 
https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/energy-a-basic-human-right/.   
22. See Maria L. Banda, Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ Advisory Opinion on the 
Environment and Human Rights, 22 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. INSIGHTS (May 10, 2018), 
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/22/issue/6/inter-american-court-human-rights-advisory-opinion-
environment-and-human#_edn1; see also Groundbreaking Inquiry in Philippines Links Carbon Majors to 
Human Rights Impacts of Climate Change, Calls for Greater Accountability, CTR. FOR INT’L ENVTL. L. 
(Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.ciel.org/news/groundbreaking-inquiry-in-philippines-links-carbon-majors-to-
human-rights-impacts-of-climate-change-calls-for-greater-accountability/.   
23. HR 20 December 2019, ECLI:NL:HR:2019:2007.   
24. The Environment and Human Rights (State Obligations in Relation to the Environment in the 
Context of the Protection and Guarantee of the Rights to Life and to Personal Integrity:  Interpretation and 
Scope of Articles 4(1) and 5(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-
23/17, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. A) No. 23 (Nov. 15, 2017) 1, 32.   
25. Lars Löfquist, Is There a Universal Right to Electricity?, 24 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 711, 718 
(2020).   
26. Id. at 711.   
27. Id. at 721.   
28. Id. at 712.   
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will have to move across different areas of international law.29  Energy and 
climate cannot be reduced to a single regime.  They are systemic concerns.  
As this Essay will discuss, the Biden administration is approaching climate 
and energy from a systemic perspective.  Yet, its approach likely lacks the 
toolkit fully to unlock the energy trilemma.  The two main problems for the 
Biden administration are the lack of a clear vision of how the energy trilemma 
can be balanced and the thorny nature of any engagement with China—an 
engagement for which the current Biden team seems not as well equipped as 
it could have been.30  At the same time, the Biden administration’s approach 
of “building back better” may well provide the building blocks out of which 
such a fuller approach could be built.31  There thus remains a reason to be 
cautiously optimistic that the Biden administration will fully embrace its 
slogan as part of a broader overhaul of the global legal energy infrastructure.   
II. BUILDING BACK BETTER 
The Biden administration recognizes the need to integrate energy 
solutions into a response involving the entire government rather than just any 
one department.32  This commitment is most clearly visible in two contexts.  
The first is in the programmatic approach to building back better.33  The 
second is in the staffing of key positions dealing with international and 
domestic energy policy.34  Both of these help us to move into focus what the 
Biden (Energy) Doctrine will likely look like.  The first subsection will 
address each of these in turn and attempt to establish what can be gleaned from 
them to deduce a Biden (Energy) Doctrine.  The second subsection will outline 
the challenges this doctrine will face both as a matter of policy statements 
 
29. The Power of America’s Example:  The Biden Plan for Leading the Democratic World to 
Meet the Challenges of the 21st Century, BIDENHARRIS, https://joebiden.com/americanleadership/ (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2021) [hereinafter Power of America].   
30. See Alex Gullén, Biden says his team has ‘no time to waste’, POLITICO (Dec. 19, 2020), 
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/12/19/biden-climate-team-announcement-448717; see also Rick 
Gladstone, Biden to Face Long List of Foreign Challenges, With China No.1, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/07/world/americas/Biden-foreign-policy.html.   
31. See Jennifer Epstein, Biden Offers ‘Build Back Better’ Plan to Revive Economy, BLOOMBERG 
(July 9, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-09/biden-offers-build-back-better-
approach-to-reviving-economy.   
32. See generally Biden Build, supra note 4.   
33. See generally Build Back Better:  Joe Biden’s Jobs and Economic Recovery Plan for Working 
Families, BIDENHARRIS, https://joebiden.com/build-back-better/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2021) [hereinafter 
Build Back Better].   
34. See, e.g., Will Englund et al., Biden to name Granhold as energy secretary, WASH. POST 
(Dec. 15, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/12/15/granholm-energy-secretary-
biden/.   
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made by the Biden administration and as a matter of the geopolitical landscape 
that the Trump administration has left behind for the Biden administration.   
A. Build Back Better as an Energy Program 
No slogan better captures the Biden administration’s aspirations than 
“build back better.”35  This slogan can be translated into four distinct areas of 
policy action under the Biden administration.  The first is a renewed 
commitment to emissions reduction under the Paris Agreement.36  The second 
is a renewed commitment to engagement—as opposed to the unilateralism of 
the Trump administration.37  Circumstances would suggest, however, that the 
Biden administration will have a more pragmatic approach of incrementalism 
as opposed to the attempts at concluding framework conventions that drove 
part of the Obama agenda.38  Third, it is likely that the Biden administration 
will seek to strengthen development aid and climate finance to support United 
States energy exports while supporting global greenhouse gas mitigation 
efforts.39  Finally, the Biden administration is not likely to abandon oil and gas 
or move to drastic steps such as carbon border adjustments.40  Rather, it will 
likely seek to bring oil and gas companies into the climate process.   
1. The Paris Agreement 
It is an article of faith for the Biden administration to rejoin the Paris 
Agreement on January 20, 2021.  Rejoining the Paris Agreement means that 
the United States will continue to participate in the procedural obligations laid 
out in the Paris Agreement.41  These procedural obligations chiefly concern 
reporting and continued negotiation towards open items on the Paris 
 
35. Build Back Better, supra note 33.   
36. See Press Release, Biden Harris Transition, Statement by President-elect Joe Biden on the 
Five-Year Anniversary of the Paris Agreement (Dec. 12, 2020), https://buildbackbetter.gov/press-
releases/statement-by-president-elect-joe-biden-on-the-five-year-anniversary-of-the-paris-agreement/.   
37. See Power of America, supra note 29.   
38. See Richard A. Kessler, Pragmatic Biden has political know-how to push green agenda, 
RECHARGE, https://www.rechargenews.com/wind/pragmatic-biden-has-political-know-how-to-push-
green-agenda/2-1-907798 (last updated Nov. 9, 2020).   
39. See generally The Biden Plan for Clean Energy Revolution and Environmental Justice, 
BIDENHARRIS, https://joebiden.com/climate-plan/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2021) [hereinafter Clean Energy 
Revolution].   
40. See Heidi Vella, Joe Biden is president-elect:  what now for US oil and gas?, OFFSHORE 
TECH., https://www.offshore-technology.com/features/joe-biden-is-president-elect-what-now-for-us-oil-
and-gas/ (last updated Dec. 6, 2020).   
41. See DANIEL BODANSKY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LAW 209–26 (2017).   
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Agreement agenda.42  Importantly, one such item that has yet to lead to broad 
agreement concerns is carbon markets.43  The United States rejoining the Paris 
Agreement will, therefore, add important information to global climate efforts 
and add a voice in favor of resolving important items left open in the Paris 
Agreement itself.44   
However, rejoining the Paris Agreement also raises a more fundamental 
question.  What happens to the United States emission reduction contributions 
under the Paris Agreement?  The Paris Agreement does not mandate emission 
reduction quotas.45  Instead, the Paris Agreement leaves it to each Member 
State to make nationally determined contributions (NDCs), in which each 
Member State sets out its own emission reduction targets.46  The Paris 
Agreement itself does not make these NDCs binding.47  NDCs can become 
binding as unilateral acts made pursuant to a treaty.48   
The original United States NDC was such a binding unilateral act.49  It 
was intended to create reliance interests in the States to increase the ambition 
in their own emission reduction policies—and it did.50  But with the Trump 
administration’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the status of the 
United States NDC has become more problematic.51   
It is likely that the Biden administration will indirectly address this 
uncertainty.52  Many of the United States’ Paris Agreement treaty partners 
 
42. Id.   
43. See Diane Desierto, COP25 NEGOTIATIONS FAIL:  CAN CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION, 
ADJUDICATION, AND/OR ARBITRATION COMPEL STATES TO ACT FASTER TO IMPLEMENT CLIMATE 
OBLIGATIONS?, BLOG EUR. J. INT’L L. (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/cop25-negotiations-fail-
can-climate-change-litigation-adjudication-and-or-arbitration-compel-states-to-act-faster-to-implement-
climate-obligations/.   
44. Emma Newburger, Biden will rejoin the Paris Climate Accord.  Here’s what happens next, 
CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/11/20/biden-to-rejoin-paris-climate-accord-heres-what-happens-
next-.html (last updated Nov. 20, 2020).   
45. See generally Paris Agreement, supra note 20, art. 2, ¶ 1(a).   
46. Id. art. 4, ¶ 2; see also Frédéric G. Sourgens, Climate Commons Law:  The Transformative 
Force of the Paris Agreement, 50 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 885, 888 (2018).   
47. Paris Agreement, supra note 20, art. 4, ¶ 11.   
48. Sourgens, supra note 46, at 893.   
49. Id. at 894.   
50. Id. at 935.   
51. Press Release, Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State, On the U.S. 
Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement (Nov. 4, 2019).   
52. See David Waskow et al., How Biden Can Make the US a Global Leader on Climate Action, 
WORLD RES. INST. (Nov. 12, 2020), https://www.wri.org/blog/2020/11/biden-us-leadership-fight-climate-
change.   
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have increased their own NDCs.53  Most notably, the European Union has 
announced such a plan.54  Therefore, it is likely that the United States will 
announce an increase in its NDC.55   
The problem with such an announcement is the manner of its 
implementation.  The first United States NDC was premised upon 
administrative action, most notably the Clean Power Plan.56  As the Biden 
administration takes office, such new administrative action will require time 
both to design and shepherd through the United States administrative law 
notice-and-comment process.57  It is likely that the Biden administration will 
look to energy policy in order to shore up its NDC.58  But the exact nature of 
this action may well be complicated by legislative agendas.  This means that 
there may be a lag between the United States’ expression of intention to 
improve upon its NDC and its ability to actually push climate policies to 
submit such an updated NDC.   
It is noteworthy that this lag time may well present an opportunity.  As 
with the first United States NDC, the United States could use the formulation 
of its own NDC as a means to coordinate with third states.59  The United States 
NDC, therefore, could become a step towards building a new global energy 
infrastructure.60  If the United States were to use the opportunity in this 
fashion, it is likely that a second United States NDC would also become 
legally binding as a unilateral act made pursuant to a treaty.  As such, it would 
tether the United States in a binding fashion to a forming international energy 




53. CAT Climate Target Update Tracker, CLIMATE ACTION TRACKER, 
https://climateactiontracker.org/climate-target-update-tracker (last updated Jan. 22, 2021); see generally 
Paris Agreement, supra note 20. 
54. CAT Climate Target Update Tracker United Kingdom, CLIMATE ACTION TRACKER, (Dec. 
12, 2020), https://climateactiontracker.org/climate-target-update-tracker/united-kingdom/.   
55. See Clean Energy Revolution, supra note 39.   
56. United States of America First NDC, U. N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
(Mar. 9, 2016), https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/United%20States%20of 
%20America%20First/U.S.A.%20First%20NDC%20Submission.pdf; JAMES E. MCCARTHY ET.AT., 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44341, EPA’S CLEAN POWER PLAN FOR EXISTING POWER PLANTS: 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (2017).   
57. See 5 U.S.C. §553.   
58.  See Clean Energy Revolution, supra note 39.   
59. Waskow, supra note 52. 
60. Id.   
61. Id.   
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2. Renewed Engagement 
The NDC process already hints at one of the hallmarks of what to expect 
from the Biden administration.  The Biden administration has vowed to re-
engage with the world by means of diplomacy.62  It has signaled a sharp turn 
around vis-à-vis the Trump administration and its brand of unilateralism.63   
As the NDC process already indicates, it is likely that this form of 
engagement will follow the blueprint for the Paris Agreement NDCs.  That is, 
there is likely to be bilateral diplomacy to shore up support for shared energy 
and climate goals with United States partners.64  One of the partners in this 
respect was Canada, and this remains as such.65  Another potential partner 
includes the European Union.66   
The most important party for such renewed engagement is China.  China 
and the United States find themselves in critical opposition on security 
questions that have significant implications for energy security.67  The most 
important difference involves the South China Sea.68  China has advanced 
significant maritime claims—claims which have been decisively rejected by 
an international law of the sea tribunal.69  Despite this loss, China has moved 
ahead with aggressive enforcement action in the South China Sea due to 
violation of international law.70  Chinese action impairs energy security as 
China is threatening natural resource exploration in the region with military 
force.71  Further, the most significant shipping lanes pass through the South 
China Sea,72 thus impairing freedom of navigation and global supply chains.   
 
62. David Sanger, The End of ‘America First’:  How Biden Says He Will Re-engage With the 
World, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/09/us/politics/biden-foreign-policy.html (last 
updated Nov. 30, 2020).   
63. Id.   
64. ERIK BRATTBERG, REINVENTING TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS ON CLIMATE, DEMOCRACY, 
AND TECHNOLOGY 1 (Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace) 1st ed. (2020). 
65. Kathiann M. Kowalski, How U.S.-Canada collaboration could boost both countries’ climate 
responses, ENERGY NEWS NETWORK (Mar. 27, 2019), https://energynews.us/2019/03/27/midwest/how-u-
s-canada-collaboration-could-boost-both-countries-climate-responses/.   
66. Brattberg, supra note 64 at 1. 
67. Wu Xinbo, U.S. Security Policy in Asia: Implications for China—-U.S. Relations, 22 ISEAS 
Yusof Ishak Inst. 479, 480 (2000).   
68. Pompeo, supra note 51.   
69. Diane A. Desierto, China’s Maritime Law Enforcement Activities in the South China Sea, 96 
INT’L L. STUD. 257, 264 (2020).   
70. Id. at 267.   
71. Lirong Wang, Sea lanes and Chinese National Energy Security, 73 J. COASTAL RSCH. 572, 
574 (2015).   
72. See How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea?, CHINAPOWER, 
https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/ (last updated Jan. 25, 2021).   
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The renewed engagement with China and other potential partners on 
energy and climate policy is likely to be bilateral and informal.  That is, the 
Biden administration is unlikely to attempt the grand bargain route of a Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP).73  This TPP was one of the most important 
documents to create a multilateral framework for deep-seated engagement on 
energy trade and infrastructure, among other goals.   
Had it been ratified, the TPP would have been one of the greatest United 
States foreign policy successes in the region.  Any multilateral treaty requires 
compromise and is in many ways imperfect.  But the rules laid out in the TPP 
would have provided a strong framework for cooperation on energy 
questions.74  It would have allowed the United States to engage China in a 
multilateral framework that would have combined energy and trade-related 
issues in a comprehensive manner.75   
But the lesson from the TPP is that such agreements make for bad 
politics.76  It is not likely that such an agreement could be ratified as a treaty 
or concluded as a Congressional-Executive Agreement.77  Such far-reaching 
policy proposals are unlikely to receive needed support from both the 
progressive left and populist right.  Consequently, diplomatic engagement 
with partners is likely to increase.  But, it is highly likely to be bilateral rather 
than broadly multilateral.  And it is more likely to be informal rather than take 
the form of treaties requiring Congressional approval.   
3. Climate Finance and Development Aid 
The Biden administration is committed to a program of energy 
infrastructure investment.78  This commitment is most visible in its domestic 
agenda.79  “Build back better” is one of the key Biden campaign slogans.80  
This slogan highlights a commitment to energy infrastructure investment in 
 
73. James McBride et al., What Is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
REL., https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-trans-pacific-partnership-tpp (last updated Feb. 1, 2021).   
74. Michael Levi, What the TPP Means for LNG, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Nov. 17, 2015), 
https://www.cfr.org/blog/what-tpp-means-lng.   
75. See Mireya Solis, The Containment Fallacy:  China and the TPP, BROOKINGS (May 24, 
2013), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2013/05/24/the-containment-fallacy-china-and-the-tpp/.   
76. See Frédéric G. Sourgens, Supernational Law, 50 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 155, 158 (2017).   
77. Oona Hathaway, Treaties’ End:  The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking 
in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1353–54 (2008) (discussing NAFTA and other free trade 
agreements).   
78. Biden Build, supra note 4.   
79. Exec. Order No. 13990, 86 Fed. Reg. 7037, 7041 (Jan. 25, 2021).   
80. Id.   
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the United States domestically.81  This commitment is more likely to succeed 
with Democratic legislative majorities in the U.S. House of Representatives 
and the U.S. Senate.   
The Biden administration’s commitment to energy infrastructure 
investments does not end at the water’s edge.  One of the main problems for 
climate action is that many states lack the means to overhaul existing energy 
infrastructure.82  This means that climate action can only be successful if states 
contribute significant funds to climate finance.83   
The Paris Agreement already contains a commitment for a climate 
finance mechanism.84  The original goal was to raise $100 billion per year in 
climate finance funding.85  This goal still falls significantly short of the 
necessary resources to meet Paris’ goals.  Ultimately, this goal, in turn, will 
have to be increased.86   
The Biden administration will likely increase its efforts in providing 
climate finance to support energy infrastructure development abroad.87  
Importantly, such climate finance does not require the direct use of U.S. 
taxpayer dollars to build powerplants overseas.88  Rather, climate finance 
relies on governments to provide guarantees for loans and assistance in 
arranging commercial and multilateral financing for projects.89  Such 
financing can take the form of investment insurance.90  Such action is more 
likely to be politically acceptable yet still supportive of infrastructure 
development overseas.   
 
81. Biden Build, supra note 4.   
82. DILIP AHUJA & MARIKA TATSUTANI, THE WORLD ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, SUSTAINABLE 
ENERGY FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 5, 9, 35 (2008).   
83. Changing the Finance, Financing the Change, U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, 
https://www.unenvironment.org/explore-topics/climate-change/what-we-do/climate-finance (last visited 
Jan. 22, 2021).   
84. Paris Agreement, supra note 20, art. 9.   
85. Jorge Gastelumendi & Inka Gnittke, Climate Finance (Article 9), in THE PARIS AGREEMENT 
ON CLIMATE CHANGE:  ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY 239, 241 (Daniel Klein et al. eds., 2017).   
86. See generally Chrysa Alexandraki, COP 24 and Climate Finance:  A Stepping Stone or a 
Blurred Line?, EJILTALK! (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/cop-24-and-climate-finance-a-
stepping-stone-or-a-blurred-line/.   
87. See Baysa Naran et al., The Biden Administration’s potential impact on climate finance, 
CLIMATE POL’Y INITIATIVE (Jan. 5, 2021), https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/the-biden-
administrations-potential-impact-on-climate-finance/.   
88. See RICHARD K. LATTANZIO, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10763, PARIS AGREEMENT:  U.S. 
CLIMATE FINANCE COMMITMENTS (2019) (discussing the different forms of international financial 
assistance).   
89. See generally id. (detailing the manners in which the U.S. provides climate finance).   
90. Id.   
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One of the reasons states offer certain forms of climate finance is because 
they can further serve as export finance.91  That is, climate finance can assist 
U.S. businesses in building and operating foreign energy projects.92  This 
means that such foreign infrastructure has a beneficial economic impact on 
the United States climate finance, which is likely an avenue of significant 
United States engagement.93   
On the other hand, it is not particularly likely that the United States will 
enter into free trade agreements in the short term.94  The Biden administration 
has already announced its intention to focus on domestic economic investment 
and growth instead.95  This means that the Biden administration will likely not 
expand market access systemically or otherwise expand trade and investment 
protections to support energy infrastructure overhaul.  At the same time, there 
is no indication that the United States will exit existing U.S. free trade 
agreements or investment protection treaties.96  The Biden administration is, 
therefore, likely to increase support for building back better abroad.  It will do 
so through informal financing mechanisms and under the protection of 
existing bilateral and multilateral treaties.  It is not likely to retool how it 
would assist in such financing and investment completely.   
4. Fossil Fuels 
The Biden administration has not indicated an all-out effort to dismantle 
the oil and gas industry.  On the domestic front, the Biden administration has 
instead attempted to follow a balancing act between environmental and energy 
interests.  This balancing act is most visible in the Biden campaign’s stance 
on hydraulic fracturing.97  The Biden campaign has announced its intention 
not to permit hydraulic fracturing on public lands.98  It has expressly rejected 
 
91. See Igor Shishlov, G20 Governments Must Urgently Align Their Export Credits With The 
Paris Agreement, ID4D (Sept. 14, 2020), https://ideas4development.org/en/paris-agreement-role-of-
export-credits/ (for a discussion of export finance in energy).   
92. See Climate Finance, WORLD RES. INST., https://www.wri.org/our-work/project/climate-
finance/climate-finance-and-private-sector (last visited Jan. 23, 2020).   
93. See generally id.   
94. See generally Tatiana L. Palermo, The future of free trade, GEOPOLITICAL INTELLIGENCE 
SERV. (Oct. 23, 2020), https://www.gisreportsonline.com/the-future-of-free-trade,economy,3340.html.   
95. See Nick Allen, Joe Biden says ‘no trade deals’ until he has invested in America first, 
TELEGRAPH (Dec. 3, 2020), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/12/02/joe-biden-says-no-trade-deals-
has-invested-america-first/.   
96. See generally Palermo, supra note 94.   
97. Vicky B. Varela, What’s Next for Fracking Under Biden?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Dec. 
18, 2020), https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/whats-next-fracking-under-biden.   
98. Id.   
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banning the process on private land.99  Further, it is unclear whether the Biden 
administration will not grandfather in existing producers on public lands.100  
This means that the ban would only apply to new oil and gas developments on 
public lands.101   
This suggests that the Biden administration will also follow an 
international policy that will be, on the whole, supportive of the oil and gas 
industry.102  Thus, it is likely that the United States will continue to support 
natural gas-fired powerplants worldwide and protect global natural gas 
infrastructure.103  (Having come full circle, the United States recently sent an 
aircraft carrier to Vietnam at the request of the Vietnamese government due 
to Chinese threats against Vietnamese leased offshore gas projects.104  The 
Biden administration will likely continue such “freedom of navigation” 
diplomacy in the region, thus protecting oil and gas industry interests in the 
region.)   
It is unlikely that the United States would drastically alter other elements 
of the international energy system.  The Biden administration looks poised to 
work with oil and gas as part of the energy mix.105  It is more likely that the 
Biden administration would work with foreign partners on tailpipe and 
smokestack technology standards.   
B. Dramatis Personae 
Policy programs are only successful to the extent that they are 
competently implemented.  Therefore, it is important not just to look at policy 
programs.  The lead actors asked to implement these programs are just as 
important.  This section will focus on a few of the leading Biden 
administration nominees that have been announced to date and assess their 




99. Id.   
100. Id.   
101. Id.   
102. Varela, supra note 97.   
103. Id.   
104. See Reuters Staff, U.S. says completes second aircraft carrier visit to Viet., REUTERS (Mar. 
11, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-vietnam-usa/u-s-says-completes-second-aircraft-carrier-
visit-to-vietnam-idUSKBN20Y0F3.   
105. Timothy Puko, Biden’s Plan to Shift Energy Policy Faces Headwinds, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 10, 
2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bidens-plan-to-shift-energy-policy-faces-headwinds-11605016802.   
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1. Lead Actors 
The three most important persons for the Biden program are Antony 
Blinken, John Kerry, and Gina McCarthy.  Antony Blinken (Blinken) is 
President Biden’s nominee to serve as Secretary of State.106  President Biden 
has nominated John Kerry (Kerry) as special envoy for climate matter.107  
Lastly, President Biden has called upon Gina McCarthy (McCarthy) to serve 
as White House coordinator on climate matters.108  Each of these individuals 
is likely to have a direct impact on the implementation of the energy policy 
program outlined in the previous section.   
Antony Blinken is a longstanding U.S. diplomat.109  Blinken first entered 
government service in 1993 as the Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary 
of State for European and Canadian Affairs.110  Blinken has since held national 
security positions and State Department positions in the Clinton and Obama 
administrations.111  Blinken has expressed strong support for increasing NDC 
ambition and has called for meetings with major emitters to do so.112  Blinken 
is known as a strong internationalist.113  He is committed to multilateralist 
solutions to foreign policy problems.114  Blinken has significant European 
experience, having attended a high school in France, and is known as a 
devotee of French culture.115  Further, he is known as a supporter of robust 
 
106. See The Cabinet, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/cabinet/ (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2021); Lara Jakes et al., Biden Chooses Antony Blinken, Defender of Global Alliances, as 
Secretary of State, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/22/us/politics/biden-antony-blinken-
secretary-of-state.html (last updated Dec. 2, 2020).   
107. The Cabinet, supra note 106; Lisa Friedman, With John Kerry Pick, Biden Selects a ‘Climate 
Envoy’ With Stature, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/23/climate/john-kerry-climate-
change.html (last visited Dec. 11, 2020).   
108. Lisa Friedman, Biden to Name Gina McCarthy, Former E.P.A. Chief, as White House 
Climate Coordinator, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/15/climate/gina-
mccarthy-biden-climate.html.   
109. Deputy Secretary State, U.S. DEP’T OF ST., https://2009-
2017.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/236057.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2021).   
110. Id.   
111. Id.   
112. Tony Walker, From ‘America first’ to ‘America together’:  who is Antony Blinken, Biden’s 
pick for secretary of state?, CONVERSATION (Nov. 25, 2020), https://theconversation.com/from-america-
first-to-america-together-who-is-antony-blinken-bidens-pick-for-secretary-of-state-150739.   
113. David M. Herszenhorn & Rym Momtaz, 9 things to know about Antony Blinken, the next US 
secretary of state, POLITICO (Nov. 23, 2020), https://www.politico.eu/article/nine-things-to-think-about-
antony-blinken/.   
114. Id.   
115. Id.   
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United States involvement in global security threats, including by military 
force.116   
John Kerry’s role as special envoy is similarly significant.  The role is a 
cabinet-level position.117  Kerry previously served as Secretary of State in the 
Obama administration.118  In fact, the Paris Agreement was concluded during 
Kerry’s tenure as Secretary of State.119  Similar to Blinken, Kerry has 
significant European leanings and is known as a Francophile.120  Prior to 
service as Secretary of State, Kerry served as a U.S. Senator.121  Thus, he 
brings strong political experience and instincts mixed together with foreign 
policy experience and weight.   
Gina McCarthy will serve as the head of the White House Office of 
Domestic Climate Policy.122  In this position, McCarthy will also have 
significant influence over energy and climate questions within the White 
House.123  McCarthy is a former Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
Administrator.124  McCarthy was one of the authors of the Clean Power 
Plan.125  This plan was at the heart of the first United States NDC.  Thus, 
McCarthy brings significant expertise from the domestic regulatory 
perspective to climate affairs.126  This expertise is particularly important as 
Kerry and McCarthy are said to be friends with a history of working together 
in formulating U.S. climate policy by combining regulatory and foreign policy 
experience.127   
 
116. Id.   
117. Kate Sullivan, Biden prioritizes climate crisis by naming John Kerry special envoy, CNN, 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/23/politics/john-kerry-biden-climate-envoy/index.html (last updated Nov. 
24, 2020).   
118. Id.   
119. Id.   
120. AFP, John Kerry Given France's Highest Honour, LOCAL (Dec. 11, 2016), 
https://www.thelocal.fr/20161211/john-kerry-given-frances-highest-honour.   
121. John Kerry, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/John_Kerry (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).   
122. Juliet Eilperin & Brady Dennis, Biden Picks Former EPA Chief as White House Climate 
Czar, WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-
environment/2020/12/15/gina-mccarthy-climate-change-czar-biden/.   
123. Id.   
124. Id.   
125. Coral Davenport & Lisa Friedman, Biden’s Twin Climate Chiefs, McCarthy and Kerry, Face 
a Monumental Task, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/16/climate/gina-mccarthy-john-
kerry-climate-adviser.html (last updated Dec. 21, 2020).   
126. Id.   
127. Id.   
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2. Supporting Actors 
Four further positions are of particular importance as the Biden team tries 
to tackle the global energy trilemma.  These positions are the EPA 
administrator, the U.S. Trade Representative, the Secretary of Defense, and 
the National Security Advisor.128  The expertise here follows the same 
footsteps as the main actors as that they have significant prior experience in 
their respective resorts.129   
President Biden chose Michael Regan as his appointee for EPA 
administrator.130  Mr. Regan has significant experience as a regulator.131  Mr. 
Regan’s past work has been in air quality regulation.132  Thus, he brings 
expertise in emissions regulations and climate matters to bear and therefore 
assists the Kerry-McCarthy team with the implementation of climate 
policies.133   
President Biden named Katherine Tai as his nominee for U.S. Trade 
Representative.134  The U.S. Trade Representative is charged with the 
negotiation of U.S. trade agreements and sets U.S. trade policy.135  Katherine 
Tai is a China expert and Mandarin speaker.136  She is expected to continue a 
tough line on China in trade questions.137   
On questions of energy security, the Biden administration national 
security team will have an outsized importance.  The main players in the 
national security team are the Secretary of Defense and National Security 
 
128. See generally NAT’L SECURITY AGENCY, https://www.nsa.gov (last visited Jan. 30, 2021); 
see also Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III, U.S. DEP’T DEF., https://www.defense.gov/Our-
Story/Meet-the-Team/Secretary-of-Defense/ (last visited Jan.30, 2021); see also OFF. OF THE U.S. REP., 
https://ustr.gov (last visited Jan. 30, 2021); see also U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2021).   
129. See NAT’L SECURITY AGENCY, supra note 128; see also Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin 
III, supra note 128; see also OFF. OF THE U.S. REP., supra note 128.   
130. See The Cabinet, supra note 106; Jeff Tollefson, Biden’s pick to head US environment agency 
heartens scientists, NATURE (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-03621-6.   
131. See Tollefson, supra note 130.   
132. Id.   
133. Id.   
134. See The Cabinet, supra note 106; Yen Nee Lee, Biden’s pick for top U.S. trade official will 
continue tough line on China, says ex-Trump official, CNBC (Dec. 18, 2020), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/18/bidens-ustr-pick-katherine-tai-will-be-tough-on-china-ex-trump-
official.html.   
135. See Lee, supra note 134.   
136. Id.   
137. Id.   
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advisor.138  President Biden has announced that he will nominate General 
Lloyd J. Austin III as Secretary of Defense.139  Austin is a former head of U.S. 
Central Command.140  His experience lies predominantly in the Middle East, 
not with China or Russia.141  Joe Biden finally chose Jake Sullivan as his 
National Security Advisor.142  Sullivan, a Clinton State Department veteran 
and later National Security Advisor to then-Vice President Biden, is known as 
one of the architects of the Iran Nuclear Deal.143   
C. The Biden Energy Doctrine 
The Obama foreign policy doctrine famously was “don’t do stupid 
shit.”144  It sought to limit foreign military entanglements in Syria, much to 
the dismay of many of the administration’s own veterans.145  At the same time, 
the Obama administration had a desire to “go big.”146  Efforts such as the TPP 
were key multilateral efforts that materially shifted U.S. foreign policy east 
with a focus on Asia.147  This Asian focus was accompanied by an attempt to 
cement this foreign policy in super-regional agreements that would achieve 
grand policy objectives in one fell swoop.148   
The Biden administration looks to follow a related but different mantra.  
What emerges from both the policy proposals and cast of characters is a focus 
on “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.”  As this discussion has shown so far, the 
Biden administration does not appear poised to propose any significant 
 
138. See generally NAT’L SECURITY AGENCY, supra note 128; see generally Secretary of Defense 
Lloyd J. Austin III, supra note 128.   
139. See The Cabinet, supra note 106; Lara Seligman et al., Biden picks retired general Lloyd 
Austin to run Pentagon, POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/news/2020/12/07/lloyd-austin-biden-
secretary-defense-frontrunner-contender-443479 (last updated Dec. 7, 2020).   
140. See The Cabinet, supra note 106; Seligman, supra note 139.   
141. Michael E. O’Hanlon et al., Around the halls:  Brookings experts on defense react to the 
nomination of Gen. Lloyd Austin, BROOKINGS (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-
from-chaos/2020/12/10/around-the-halls-brookings-experts-on-defense-react-to-the-nomination-of-gen-
lloyd-austin/.   
142. Natasha Bertrand, The inexorable rise of Jake Sullivan, POLITICO (Nov. 27, 2020), 
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/11/27/jake-sullivan-biden-national-security-440814.   
143. Id.   
144. Michael T. Klare, Why Hillary Clinton Is Wrong About Obama’s Foreign Policy, NATION 
(Sept. 3, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/why-hillary-clinton-wrong-about-obamas-
foreign-policy/.   
145. Id.   
146. See, e.g., McBride et al., supra note 73.   
147. See id.   
148. See generally id.   
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multilateral free trade agreements, such as the TPP, that might be able to alter 
energy supply chains globally.149  Additionally, the Biden administration does 
not appear to be able to invest significant funds abroad to support energy 
infrastructure transformations directly.  Finally, the Biden administration does 
not appear to depart from existing energy security paradigms significantly.   
This approach appears fundamentally consistent with the people staffed 
at the top.  The Biden team is highly competent.  But it is also fundamentally 
conservative with a little c.  That is, it has a strong belief in the status quo and 
in fact, seems poised to return to it rather than to build a new paradigm.  This, 
therefore, suggests a mentality to keep with existing approaches.   
On its face, it is difficult to reconcile “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” with 
“build back better.”  The “better” more than implies that existing structures 
are fundamentally flawed.  Therefore, the idea is to improve infrastructure, 
improve living conditions, build more equitable energy systems, and more 
equitable economies.   
In the end, the two slogans do remain fundamentally consistent with each 
other.  The Biden administration fundamentally believes in existing 
international legal processes.  The administration does not wish to change the 
status because it believes that these processes are, in fact, able to deliver an 
incrementally better economic and energy infrastructure.   
In sum, one should expect the Biden administration to support energy 
security, energy equity, and environmental sustainability within the strictures 
of the Paris Agreement and classic U.S. foreign policy.  One should not expect 
a fundamental departure legally, even as the Biden administration will attempt 
to use these existing mechanisms to different ends—namely, to strengthen 
renewable energy projects in the United States and support the construction 
of such projects globally.   
III. THE CHALLENGE AHEAD 
The Biden administration’s approach presents several challenges for 
energy policy going forward.  Some of these challenges are premised in 
personnel.  Others are premised in a structural under-ambition to resolve the 
problems posed by the energy trilemma.  This section will briefly address each 
of these challenges in turn.   
A. The Asia Problem 
One of the key problems apparent in the senior team assembled by 
President Biden has been its regional focus.  Antony Blinken and John Kerry 
 
149. See Palermo, supra note 94.   
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are first and foremost European experts.150  Their focus in diplomacy and 
personal experience has focused on the European continent.151   
At the same time, much of the expertise of the Biden administration on 
the national security side is focused on the Middle East.152  General Austin has 
significant experience as head of Central Command.153  Jack Sullivan, on the 
other hand, is best known for his work on the Iran Nuclear Deal.154  Their 
expertise thus is focused, in particular, on one of the last theaters of United 
States engagement—the Middle East.155   
Today’s global energy challenges are not European.  Nor do they have 
their roots in the Middle East.  These challenges have a significant Asian 
component.  The most important player in global energy systems—outside of 
the United States—is China.156  Without China, it is unlikely that climate 
change can be halted.157  Without China, it is very difficult for the majority of 
Asia to live with energy security because China has aggressive enforcement 
in the South China Sea.158  The South China Sea, of course, is both important 
as a focal point for global shipping lanes and as a source of significant natural 
gas reserves in the region.159   
The Biden administration’s team is not attuned to the challenges of this 
region.  The leading China expert in the administration is the U.S. Trade 
Representative Tai.160  But statements by the Biden administration have 
indicated that new free trade agreements are not a priority.161  Consequently, 
the skillset of the U.S. Trade Representative will not be a direct asset in 
handling the difficult relationship with China and the rest of Asia.   
This is not to say that the Biden administration will not be able to 
overcome these challenges.  It is, however, an interesting reversal of the 
Obama administration’s shift to Asia.  As personnel implements policy, this 
 
150. See generally Herszenhorn & Momtaz, supra note 113; see, e.g., AFP, supra note 120.   
151. See generally Herszenhorn & Momtaz, supra note 113; see, e.g., AFP, supra note 120.   
152. See generally Power of America, supra note 29.   
153. Seligman et al., supra note 139.   
154. See generally Bertrand, supra note 142.   
155. See generally Power of America, supra note 29.   
156. See Brye Butler Steeves & Helton Ricardo Ouriques, Energy Security:  China and the United 
States and the Divergence in Renewable Energy, 38 CONTEXTO INTERNACIONAL 643, 643, 658 (2016).   
157. See id. at 658.   
158. Desierto, supra note 69.   
159. South China Sea - what you need to know, DEUTSCHE WELLE, (Aug. 11, 2017), 
https://www.dw.com/en/south-china-sea-what-you-need-to-know/a-40054470.   
160. Lee, supra note 134.   
161. Allen, supra note 95.   
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personnel seems less able to implement Asian policy as efficiently as one 
might have hoped.  Thus, there are significant challenges ahead.   
B. The Trilemma Problem 
The Biden administration faces a more deep-seated problem with its 
energy approach in another regard.  The Biden doctrine of “if ain’t broke, 
don’t fix it” works at the margins.  It is unlikely to solve many of the systemic 
problems underlying energy transition.  That is, the Biden administration has 
significant ambition, but the tools it intends to use are not up to the task.   
The key problem the Biden administration will face is to achieve both 
domestic and global buy in for a significant ramp up in climate action.  
Climate action increases energy costs.162  Increased energy costs 
disproportionately impact people with less means.163  So, as a whole, it is 
likely that people will protest against such climate action.164  Such protests in 
France, in fact, derailed French carbon taxation plans.165  On the international 
side, it is similarly difficult to convince States to increase climate ambition 
without an incentive of increased development.  And this increased 
development hinges in large part on economic growth that typically comes 
with increased free trade.   
The Biden administration thus must find a tool to increase energy equity 
domestically and globally.  The domestic tool to address this problem appears 
to be governmental energy infrastructure investment.  If sufficiently 
ambitious, this tool might go a long way to address the underlying equity 
problem.  But this is only half the battle; the same equity concern is replicated 
internationally.  There thus needs to be a significant increase in global 
investment in energy infrastructure.  Such investment only makes sense with 
a ramp-up and potential overhaul of free trade agreements.  That is, it seems 
impossible to solve environmental sustainability and climate change without 
also addressing the broader international economic order.   
 
162. Joel Jaeger & Devashree Saha, 10 Charts Show the Economic Benefits of US Climate Action, 
WORLD RES. INST. (July 28, 2020), https://www.wri.org/blog/2020/07/economic-benefits-climate-action-
us.   
163. See, e.g., Ariel Drehobl, Low-Income Households Pay More for Energy, but Efficiency Can 
Help, U.S. NEWS (Sept. 30, 2021), https://www.usnews.com/news/healthiest-communities/articles/2020-
09-30/poor-households-pay-more-for-energy-but-efficiency-can-help.   
164. See Somini Sengupta, Protesting Climate Change, Young People Take to Streets in a Global 
Strike, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/20/climate/global-climate-strike.htm (last updated 
Sept. 21, 2019).   
165. Bate Felix, France’s Macron learns the hard way:  green taxes carry political risks, REUTERS 
(Dec. 2, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-climate-change-france-protests/frances-macron-learns-
the-hard-way-green-taxes-carry-political-risks-idUSKBN1O10AQ.   
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The Biden administration further does not seem to have a clear plan to 
address energy security.  Currently, Chinese activity in the South China Seas 
negatively affects energy security for the reasons outlined above.  However, 
China is also a key state in building an environmental coalition sufficient to 
halt and turn back climate change.166  Here, energy security and environmental 
sustainability appear at loggerheads with each other.  The Biden 
administration appears to be focused on climate policy.  But this focus is 
always a hostage of security concerns.  So far, the Biden administration has 
not developed a plan for how to address this tension.   
In other words, part of the problem of “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” is 
that the Biden administration appears to be too pragmatic to achieve its own 
climate ends.  A greater focus on the “build back better” prong of its approach 
would likely require a deeper investment in international economic law by the 
United States.  It requires a commitment to grow energy infrastructures 
globally.  But such a commitment is only realistic if the Biden administration 
changes its priorities on free trade agreements.  To build back better, and to 
meet climate change, is trade policy.  It is not just environmental or foreign 
policy.  This reality so far appears to be missing from the Biden 
administration’s overall more cautious approach.   
 
 
166. See Steeves & Ouriques, supra note 156, at 658.   
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